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RECENT DECISIONS
tended to restrict circulation of published matter, whether the legislation was
passed under the guise of the state taxing power or the state police power. See
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); and Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697 (1931).
The First Amendment guarantees the right of the individual to express his
views as to current issues and controversies. One of the main organs for such
expression is the national magazine. There the reader finds editorial comment,
letters to the editors, portraits of men in public office and general political argumentation. See current issues of Newsweek, Collers, The Atlantic Monthly and
Time. The fact that these magazines are printed for profit as well as for the
dissemination of political information should not make them any less protected
than a pamphlet distributed on religious matters, see Struthers case, supra, at
least where the conflicting right involved is that of the right of the individual's
privacy in his own home.
It is submitted that perhaps the decision in the instant case can best be understood if viewed with the Court's extended interest in preserving the privacy of the
individual. The Green River type ordinance, although it affects interstate commerce, is upheld as a valid exercise of the state police power when such ordinance
is designed to provide to the home owner a privacy uninterrupted by house to
house peddlers of varied house-hold articles. Town of Green River v. Fuller
Brush Co.. supra. A blanket denial to all of the use of sound amplifying devices
on the city's streets does not contravene the rights of "free speech," and "free
press" if such denial is intended to protect the citizens from the annoyances of loud
noises. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.77 (1948).
In the instant case, the Court has taken another step in the recognition of the
citizen's right of privacy. The Court has now ruled that the constitutional guarantee
of "free press" which is not absolute, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158
(1944), must also give way to the right of the citizen to be free from invasions of
his privacy.
Joseph A. Taddeo

FEDERAL PRACTICE-DEPENDENT CLAIM DISMISSED ON FAILURE OF
FEDERAL CLAIM
A patent was issued on a removable shoulder pad for use in women's dresses.
The patentee (plaintiff here) entered into an agreement with the defendant in
this action whereby the latter was to have the use of the patent, if valuable, and in
return would compensate the patentee for such use. The defendant used the device,
but has failed to make payment. The United States Court of Appeals, Second
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Circuit, held the patent invalid for lack of invention and, therefore, not infringed.
It said that it had no jurisdiction over the second claim which asserted a breach of
this agreement through failure to pay royalties, as it was a simple contract claim not
arising out of the same identical facts giving rise to the patent action, and there was
no diversity of citizenship. Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, 189 F. 2nd 596
(2d Cir. 1951).
The Supreme Court held in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213
U. S. 175 (1908) that a Federal court, when it acquires jurisdiction over a suit
because a federal question is involved, may pass on all issues in the case, even
though it decides the federal question adversely to the party raising it. However,
in its reaffirmation of that rule in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933) the
court said that the rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume
jurisdiction over a separate and distinct cause of action merely because it is joined
in a complaint with the federal cause of action. The Supreme Court distinguished
between a case where there are two distinct grounds alleged for one cause of
action, only one of which is a federal question, and a case where two separate and
distinct causes of action are alleged, one only, being federal in character. In the
first of those situations, where the federal question is nor plainly wanting in substance, the Federal court, even though the federal ground is nor established, may
dispose of the case on the non-federal ground. In the second situation, the court
may not hear the non-federal question on failure of the federal cause.
The Second Circuit has uniformly given a narrow interpretation to the
Hum rule despite persistent objection by Judge Clark. In Lewis v. Vendome
Bags Inc., 108 F. 2nd 16 (2d Cir. 1939) the court dismissed a copyright claim,
and then held that it could not decide a claim of unfair competition which arose
from different facts as this was a separate cause of action. In Afusher Foundation
Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. 2nd 9 (2d Cir. 1942) Augustus Hand, speaking
for the court said that their interpretation of the Hum rule was that a non-federal
claim, over which the court had no jurisdiction because of the absence of diversity,
might be heard on failure of the federal claim if the non-federal differed only
because it asserted a different ground of recovery upon substantially the same set
of facts. Similarly in Kaplan v. Helen Hart Novelty Co., 182 F. 2nd 311 (2d Cir.
1950) a majority of the court said that joinder of an unregistered trade mark
claim with a patent claim did not give the court jurisdiction over the trade mark
claim because the rights in issue under the patent and those under the trade mark
are not dependent upon substantially the same facts. In the present suit, the facts
involved in the two claims are not substantially the same and do not meet the
Humn test.
The majority's finding in the instant case that the second claim was for breach
of contract seems well substantiated. In Chadiloid Chemical Co, v. Johnson, 203
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Fed. 993 (7th Cir. 1913) there was a violation of a license agreement and the
patentee charged the licensee with infringement. The court held that covenants
to pay royalties are matters of contract law and no words of the parties can make
them matters of patent law. A claim in contract raises no federal question. Also
in American Pastry Products Corp. v. United Products Corp. et al, 39 F. 2nd 181
(D. Mass. 1930) the court said that if there was an outstanding license on the face
of which the defendant's conduct is authorized, in other words if it is within the
scope of the license, the matter is one of contract. Since this second claim does
not arise out of the same narrow set of facts as -the federal claim, which is the
requirement of the Hur rule, and since it is not unfair competition as required
by the statutory exception to the rule, the majority concluded there was no jurisdiction.
Judge Clark in his dissent argues that the facts as presented in this second
claim constitute unfair competition, and therefore bring the case under 28 U.S.C.A.,
sec. 1338 (B) (1948) the statutory exception to the Huar rule. See Schreyer
et al v. Casco Products Corp., 89 F. Supp. 177 (D. Conn. 1950). This section
declares that "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related
claim under the copyright, patent or trade mark laws."
Although it is difficult to agree with Clark's finding that the claim was one
for unfair competition, the policy behind his reasoning is admirable. The federal
rule as to dependent jurisdiction is too strict and it causes unfortunate "piece meal
litigation." Judge Clark has stated that it will be no loss to statecraft if, in the
daily activities of courts, the need of practical administration may dissuade
compelling two lawsuits where one-will completely serve the interests of the parties.
Lewis v. Vendome Bags Inc., supra at 20. To reject all consideration of what is
spread upon the record and invite renewal of litigation in a state court is a lack of
judicial economy hardly demanded to sustain our form of government. Treasure
Imports v. Henry Amdur & Son, 127 F. 2nd 3 (2d Cir. 1942).
It is submitted that broad congressidnal hction should make possible the
common sense treatment of this subject. Perhaps some day Congress will enact
legislation broadening the dependent jurisdiction of the federal courts. Such a law
could require that where a bona fide federal claim fails, and the dependent nonfederal claim arises out of the same general fact situation, the federal courts should
entertain jurisdiction over the dependent claim.
Charles Ryan Desmond

